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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, two inextricably connected issues have received a great
deal of attention in both U.S. political discourse and in the legal academic
literature. One issue of intense legal debate and frustration has been that of
judicial recusal, including an examination of the appropriate standards that
should necessarily apply to judges that seem conflicted or biased in their role
as neutral arbiter.1 A second issue that has spawned heated commentary and
*
Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law; Professor of Law,
West Virginia University College of Law. For excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Brad
Biren, The University of Iowa College of Law, class of 2011. For reviewing early drafts of this
piece, I am grateful to Professor Anne Marie Lofaso, West Virginia University College of Law.
Of course, as usual, the politics and errata of this Essay belong exclusively to me.
1.
See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.)
(deciding Justice Scalia's relationship with Vice President Cheney did not require his recusal);
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great dispute over the past decade is that of campaign-finance law, including
examination of the role that powerful and wealthy benefactors play in
American electioneering.2 Both issues carne to a head in the past year as the
U.S. Supreme Court decided two landmark cases that will have far-reaching
implications and consequences, Caperton v. A. T Massey CoaP and Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.4 The moment that these decisions were
announced, their connection undoubtedly crystallized for many observers.
As Caperton and Citizens United shed new light on judicial recusal and
campaign finance in an interconnected manner, Professor Michael LeRoy
delivers an important empirical study, Do PartisanElections ofJudges Produce
Unequal Justice When Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?,5 that provides
evidence that we as a nation have reason to fear this potentially pernicious
interconnectedness. 6
In a confluence of circumstance, what has been historically
controversial now puts in present peril the concept of 'justice" and whether
it can be "equal" in U.S. courts. Citizens United, Caperton and Do Partisan
Elections of Judges Produce Unequal Justice Wen Courts Review Employment
Arbitrations?together pose a troubling question: will judges who are elected

see also Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guardingthe lenhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural V/oid in the
Cout, o/ LasI Resor, 57 RiTGERS L. REV. 107, 137-52 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's
recusal standards); Maureen Dowd, Quid Pto Quack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 4, available at
2004 WLNR 5404331 ("In an admirable spirit of uncommon objectivity, in the pursuit of truth,
justice and the American way, Associate Justice Scalia made time to poke around in the marshes
of Louisiana with the equally scrupulous Dick Cheney, and then, refreshed by a well-deserved
plane trip at our expense, he continued to transmit his enlightenment to a grateful nation.").
2.
SeeRobert Barnes, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says She Would FoIbid State judicial Elections,
WYASH. POsT, Mar. 12, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/ 2010/ 03/ 11 /AR2010031105136.html;
Nina Totenberg, Justice O'Connor
Criticizes Canpaign inance Ruling, NAI'I. Puli. RADIO Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storvld=122993740&ft=1&f=1003.
See
generally
Shirley
S.
Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. RiV. 973, 973 (2001) (examining the
"benefits and drawbacks of popular elections of state court judges"); Lawrence M. Friedman,
Benchnatks: Judges on Trial, Judicial Selection and Election, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 451 (2009)
(discussing the unique U.S. system for judicial elections); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money
and ieedon of/Speech, 30 U.C. DxIs L. Riv. 663 (1997) (advocating the elimination of campaign
contribution limits). The tern "electioneering" describes taking active part in an election and
more specifically "to work for the election of a candidate or party." See Electioneng MIFRRIAMWiEBSTiER ONILINi DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/electioneering
(last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
3.

129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

4.

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

5.
Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan Elections of/fudges Produce Chnequalfufstice When Courts
Re view Enployien/ Arbi/ta/ions?, 95 lowA L. RENT.1569 (2010).
6.
Citizens U1nited and CaperIon serve to actuate the inevitable concern expressed by many
that campaign contributions and free speech protection issues have the potential to corrupt an
elected judiciary. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Lxpendiliuoes and Free Speech, 33 HA\RV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing the regulation of campaign expenditures and electoral
speech).
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in a partisan manner, where corporations can now more directly influence
the result of judicial elections by contributing large cash electioneering
outflows, manufacture outcomes that are biased toward those contributing
corporations? The early returns are not good.
That is to say, contemporary empirical evidence suggests that the
answer to the inquiry posed above is "yes." Apparently partisan elected
judges are unable to sit neutrally when large corporate expenditure ushered
them to the bench. Or stated differently, when corporations are able to
manipulate the judicial election process through significant cash
disbursement, a judge that is unfriendly, if not hostile, to employee rights
will be the likely result.7 The Supreme Court's decisions in Citizens United
and Caperton stand poised to exacerbate this disheartening empirical
implication.
The Supreme Court's acrimonious 5-4 decision in Citizens United struck
down federal law that had prohibited U.S. corporations, in specific and
narrow circumstances, from making direct election expenditures on behalf
of politicians or judges running for public office.8 In a carefully
circumscribed way,9 federal law before Citizens United had prohibited
corporations from using general treasury funds to make direct
electioneering appeal to voters through visual media thirty or sixty days in
advance of an election. 10 The Supreme Court viewed this prohibition as
violative of the First Amendment free speech rights of corporations and
struck down the federal law as unconstitutional." This decision, delivered by
a bitterly divided Court, has generated much controversy and derision.' 2 At
bottom, many commentators believe that corporations are now free to
powerfully influence, even more than they already do, the assortment of
individuals that will sit in Congress, the White House, and on the judicial

7.
In this Essay, I purposely confine my comments to the influence that corporate
expenditure will have on American judicial elections. While I recognize that some of what I say
here has similar applicability to labor unions and union electioneering influence, I focus on
corporations for two primary reasons: First, labor unions simply do not possess the same ability
and power to raise and control capital as corporations do. Unions are likely to be positioned by
(iiens IUited in a way that muffles or drowns voice or message by dominant corporate
messaging. Second, corporate ends and goals are wildly different than are the goals of unions
and labor. Corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder profit while union goals are
primarily to enhance the liberty rights of workers. See generally, Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a
Foundational Themy of okers' Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Wne, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2007)
(exploring the relationship between the labor market and labor unions).
8.

Cilizens Uni/ted, 130 S. Ct. at 888-92.

9.

Id. at 944 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

10.

Id. at 888 (majority opinion).

11.

Id. at 916-17.

12.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also William J. Rinner, Note, Maximizing
Pa;riipation Through Camnpaign I inance Regulalion: A Ca) and Trade Mechanisn for Poli/ical Money,
119 YALE L.J. 1060, 1064-81 (2010) (switching the focus regarding the value of pursuing
campaign finance reform from notions of liberty and equality to citizen participation).
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bench, selecting those who will warmly embrace their specific corporate
interests.' 3
In Caperton, an equally rancorous Supreme Court, divided again 5-4,
decided that under specific and narrow circumstances, due process requires
that a judge recuse herself from cases where a financial donor is a party
before the court and that donor played a significant monetary role in the
judge assuming her seat on the very bench before which the case is
pending.14 As judicial recusal standards are notoriously loose and open to
individual judicial divination,1 5 Caperton attempts to place slight parameters
around judges who have accepted generous financial support in gaining the
judicial post by requiring recusal in situations where that generous financial
benefactor appears before the court in which the individual, corporation, or
Political Action Committee ("PAC") sought to insert the judge.16 The
Caperton majority in announcing this narrow due process benchmark was
very careful to state, repeatedly, that the circumstances that gave birth to this
new recusal standard were "exceptional," "extreme," "rare," and
"extraordinary,"1 7 signaling that the Court believes its new rule will impact
only an exceedingly narrow sliver of cases andjudges.18
Professor LeRoy's empirical study, Do PartisanElections ofJudges Produce
UnequalJustice When Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?, finds that judges
who are elected in partisan races are significantly more likely to rule in favor
of corporations and against employees when confronted with employment
law disputes than are those judges who are either appointed or elected to
their judicial posts in nonpartisan elections.19 Through the lens of
mandatory employment arbitration appeals, LeRoy's data shows that when
partisan-elected judges review arbitration decisions, employees win only
32.1% of the cases compared to arbitration appeals in front of appointed or
nonpartisan elected judges where employees win 52.7% of the time.20 This

13.
See Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS.J. 533, 578-88 (2010); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Elimination of ederal Resictions on
Corpotate Spending in Politics: Corporations Can JHave a Voice!, CORP. Jusi. Bi O(G (Mar. 23, 2010,
11:39
AM),
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.coni/2010/03/elinination-of-federalrestrictions-on.html (discussing the implications of Citizens United); Steven A. Ramirez, The
Corpowrtocray and Race and Gender: Interest Convergence Themy, CORP.JIUSi. Bi OG (Jan. 31, 2010,
4:32 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.coni/2010/01/corporatocracy-and-race-andgender.html [hereinafter Ramirez, The Corpowrtoracy and Race and Gender]; Steven A. Ramirez,
Welcome to the Corpmratoray. . ., CORP.JisTi. Bi OG (Jan. 24, 2010, 12:11 AM), http://corporate
justiceblog.blogspot.cont/2010/01/wNelcome-to-corporatocracy.htil (describing Ciizens United
as a major power shift toward corporations and corporate interests and away from individuals).
14.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).

15.

See Roberts, .supa note 1, at 134-64.

16.

Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.

17.

Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

18.

Id. at 2265 (majority opinion).

19.

See LeRoy, .supa note 5, at 1602 tbl.3.

20.

See id.
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large gap in the data suggests troubling inferences for judges who are
selected in partisan elections where corporations are now free, per Citizens
United, to engage in largely unfettered free speech electioneering and
where, per Caperton, recusal parameters are tightly constrained to very
limited circumstances.
This Essay seeks to make sense of this confluence of Supreme Court
decision making and recent empirical evidence. In examining this
intermingling and its potential repercussions, Part II briefly considers
several of Professor LeRoy's more disquieting findings in Do PartisanElections
ofJudges Produce UnequalJustice When Courts Review Employment Arbitrations21
Part III reviews the holding of the controversial Citizens United in light of
LeRoy's empirical report. Part IV examines the Caperton decision and
queries whether it will have any protective effects in connection with
corporate influence over the partisan judicial election process. Part V
interrogates the consequences of LeRoy's study, Citizens United, and Caperton,
views each through a corporate law prism, and seeks to offer forward-looking
conclusions and recommendations.
II.

Do PARTISAN ELECTIONS OF JUDGES PRODUCE UNEQUALJUSTICE WHEN
COURTS REVIEw EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATIONS?

Professor Michael LeRoy begins his empirical study with the question
"Do partisan elections of judges contribute to unequal justice in court
decisions?"22 Though LeRoy is careful to cabin his answer and the
implications of his empirical analysis,23 the answer to his query appears to be
most probably "yes." 24 Through a pointed analysis of appealed employment
dispute arbitration cases, LeRoy is able to quantify the number of appeals
appearing before partisan-elected judges and track the outcomes of those
arbitration appeals. Similarly, the empirical data examines those
employment arbitration appeals that come before appointed judges and
those elected in nonpartisan elections and tracks those results. In front of
partisan-electedjudges, employees are successful in the appeal outcome only
32% of the time.2 5 Conversely, before appointed judges and nonpartisan
elected judges, employees are successful in the appeal outcome 53% of the
time.26 This single differentiation is significant and demands further

21.

LeRoy, supra note 5.

22.

See id. at 1572.

23.

See id. at 1605, 1612-14 ("This study is more about the possibilities than the realities of
corporate influence over thejudicial process for reviewing arbitrator rulings.").
24.
See id. at 1605 ("Although this research does not prove that employers give strategically
to state-court judges in order to extend their liability-avoidance strategies, it does provide
preliminary and limited support for the proposition that partisan judicial elections produce
unequal justice.").
25.

See id. at 1602 tbl.3.

26.

See id.
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examination. These results suggest that partisan-elected judges empirically
favor corporate interests and disfavor employee interests at an alarming rate.
Of course, as LeRoy is swift to acknowledge, empirically examining
appeal outcomes proves little aside from uncovering a startling disparity and
beginning the debate by asking why such significant inequality exists
between partisan-elected judges and appointed or nonpartisan elected
judges in employment arbitration appeal outcomes.27 Still, the data leads
one to a likely conclusion that partisan-elected judges are much friendlier to
corporate interests than are appointed judges. The data tends to show that
partisan-elected judges are less likely to approve reasoned arbitration
decisions that come down in favor of employees. The empirical analysis
supports LeRoy's initial hypothesis that 'judges selected in partisan elections
where corporate political contributions are likely prevalent tend to decide
cases in favor of corporate employers."28 While limited, LeRoy's findings are
potentially explosive. The station of judge in the United States is roundly
considered to be one of a dispassionate, respected, unbiased, neutral, and
fair arbiter of equal justice before the law.29 LeRoy's findings undermine our
judicial ideal.
Professor LeRoy points to two trends in his analysis that tend to support
the argument that our nation's courts and judges have grown more hostile
toward employees and their rights under the law. First, LeRoy carefully

27.

See id. at 1605, 1613-14.

28.

Id. at 1604.

29.
See Clarence Thomas, judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (" [I]n my mind,
impartiality is the very essence ofjudging and of being ajudge. Ajudge does not look to his or
her sex or racial, social, or religious background when deciding a case. It is exactly these factors
that a judge must push to one side in order to render a fair, reasoned judgment on the
meaning of law. In order to be a judge, a person must attempt to exorcise himself or herself of
the passions, thoughts, and emotions that fill any frail human being. He must become almost
pure, in the way that fire purifies metal, before he can decide a case. Otherwise, he is not a
judge...."); Dana Bash & Emily Sherman, Solomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comnieni a Staple ( Her
Slpeechs, CNN.COM, Jun. 8, 2009, http://xww.cnn.coim/2009/POLITICS/06/05/sotomavor.
speeches/ (describing the controversy surrounding Justice Sonia Sotomayor's statement that
she believes a wise Latina judge makes decisions from a more nuanced place that white male
judges); Text u/fohn Robeuts Opening Stalenen, USA TorDLY, Sept. 12, 2005, http://vww.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2005-09-12-roberts-fulltext-x.htm ("Judges and justices are servants of
the law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by
the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. Judges
have to have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent, shaped
by other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath."). But see andre douglas pond
cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Claewe Thomas, A/irnmative Action and the Treachery of
Originalism: "The Sun Don'l Shine Hee in This Pail ( Town," 21 HARV. BiACKLETiTR L.J. 1, 59
(2005) (challenging Clarence Thomas's assertion that he is a neutral, dispassionate judge);
Daphne Eviatar, Sen. Whitehouse Denounces Roberts' (hnpitr Theoty ofludging, TIIE WASII. INDEP.,
July 13, 2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/50647/sen-wNhitehouse-denounces-robertsumpire-theory-of-judging (quoting Senator Sheldon Whitehouse challenging John Roberts'
assertion that he is a neutral "umpire" in hisjudicial reasoning).
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breaks down the employment arbitration process as it has evolved in the
United States for the past several decades.30 Second, LeRoy provides a brief
description of the meteoric rise of campaign contributions, particularly
those made by corporations in the context of judicial elections across those
states that engage partisan judicial elections.3 1 In reviewing both, LeRoy
connects the litigation avoidance strategy employed by corporations through
adopting the mandatory arbitration process and the trend toward
challenging adverse decisions in the state courts, while simultaneously
employing a stratagem of significantly influencing the judicial election
process with large campaign contributions on behalf of those judges that
embrace an employer friendly view of employment disputes.
The legal development of workplace disputes in America, under any fair
observation, reveals a trending toward favoring employers and corporations
and away from protecting the rights of employees.3 2 During the past decade,
corporations began carefully selecting, imposing, and manipulating the
mandatory arbitration process and embracing it as a strategic tactic
employed to avoid liability, courts, and costs.33 By imposing mandatory
arbitration upon its employees, corporations sought to bar individual
employees from suing them, thus limiting litigation risks and costs and
further specifying arbitral forums and arbitration-process rules.34 As
corporations were securing judicial approval of the mandatory arbitration
process and busying themselves with writing mandatory arbitration clauses
that favored their interests in every conceivable way, 35 something
unexpected happened: employees began winning their arbitration
hearings.3 6 This untenable result from the perspective of employers forced
corporations to either abandon the mandatory arbitration process, or more
often, begin seeking state court review of the "final and binding" arbitration
proceedings it had forced upon its employee in the first instance.37
Corporations, in demanding to have it both ways, forced their employees
into mandatory arbitration, but then upon discovery that the sought-after
protections against employee claims were not forthcoming at the hoped-for

30.

31.

See LeRoy, supra note 5, at 1576-90.

dM.at 1590-97.

32.
See id., at 1576-90; Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistenc of Union Repression in an Era of
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 202-04 (2010); Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The
Latest Battle in the War on Workers' Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act (May

2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133607.
33.
See LeRoy, supra note 5, at 1576-81.
34. See id. at 1581-82.
35.
See id. ("Numerous examples show how emplovers strategically avoided public justice
by first requiring arbitration and then requiring the use of rules that disadvantage employees.
Employers required their workers to waive their right to sue and to use arbitration in place of
courts.") (footnote omitted).
36.

See id. at 1582-83.

37.

See id. at 1584-86.
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percentages, began challenging the arbitration awards in the state courtsthose very same courts that corporations had sought to avoid by forcing
mandatory arbitration.38 As challenging arbitration awards in courts has
become commonplace, the need to have a "certain" kind of judge on the
bench has become imperative to corporations and their human executives.
The rise of campaign contributions in state judicial elections is
breathtaking. LeRoy reports that state judicial campaign contributions have
skyrocketed in the past decade.39 "Thirty-nine states hold judicial elections.
Between 2000 and 2009, State Supreme Court candidates raised $205.8
million, according to the Justice at Stake Campaign, a watchdog group that
monitors money in court races. That was more than double the $84.9
million raised the previous decade." 40 Alabama Supreme Court candidates
raised a combined $13.4 million during a recent election cycle, and a sitting
judge and his opponent in an Illinois state court race raised $9.3 million
between them, "an amount that exceeded expenditures that year in
eighteen of thirty-four U.S. Senate campaigns."41 Spending for state
supreme court seats in fourteen states increased 167% from 2000 to 2002
and increased another 163% from 2002 to 2004.42 Of course, the primary
concern with this skyrocketing spending on state judicial elections is the
threat posed to the ideal of judicial independence.43 Can a judge be truly
independent when he or she has received extraordinary financial support
from various interest groups and owes his or her seat on the bench to a
particular benefactor or group?
Further, recent trends in judicial campaign finance indicate that out-ofstate special interest groups are now taking particular issue interest in
judicial candidates that meet their campaign contribution "criteria."44
Corporations and special interest groups, whose own states do not conduct
partisan judicial elections, are now identifyingjudicial candidates that run in
partisan election states and are directing their out-of-state funding toward
election of particular candidates that have expressed a favored judicial

38. See id. at 1586 ("[Elmployers have not been shy about challenging adverse arbitration
awards in court.").
39.

See id. at 1590-91.

40.
Dorothy Samuels, Op-Ed., JHanging a For Sale" Sign Over the Judiciar, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/opinion/30sat4.html.
41.

See LeRoy, .supmanote 5, at 1593.

See id. at 1593 (citing Charles Gardner Geyh, The Lndlessjudicial Selecion Debate and Why
It AlattersjorfudicialIndependete, 21 GiO.J. Li(AL EiilCs 1259, 1265 (2008)).
42.

43.

See Matthew Mosk, Citizens United v. the FEC: The Return o Corporate Influence Peddling?,

ABC NEws, Jan. 13, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/citizens-united-fec-return-corporateinfluence-peddling/story?id=9545153&page 1; Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Jmpact of
Citizens United on Judicial Elctions, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (May 5, 2010), http://
www.brennancenter.org/content/ resource /buying justice-the-impact of citizens united on
judicial elections/#_edn5.
44.

See LeRoy,

.supm

note 5, at 1592-93.
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viewpoint. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recently struck down state
laws aimed at prohibiting particular political speech in judicial elections,
thereby making it possible for judicial candidates running for election to
make statements about abortion, rape, capital punishment, and gun control,
amongst others. 5 This, of course, allows candidates to curry favor with
special interest groups that will provide campaign contributions to that
judicial candidate that best promises to support a particular issue of interest.
These trends continue to exist in an environment that claims to prize
judicial independence and fair and impartial arbiters. LeRoy's empirical
analysis prods the thoughtful reader to consider whether judicial
independence remains a possibility in the new world of Citizens United and
current campaign funding trends.
III. CITTZENS UNTED

Citizens United created a firestorm upon its release.4 6 Condemned by a
sitting president in a State of the Union address,47 the case explicitly
overruled a line of judicial precedent that effectively outlawed direct
corporate electioneering under specific circumstances and declared
carefully crafted
campaign-finance
law as enacted by Congress
unconstitutional.4 8 The holding of Citizens United makes permissible a
corporation's direct expenditure of general treasury funds to explicitly
endorse or malign a candidate for public office immediately prior to an
election. 49 According to the Supreme Court, the free speech rights of

45.

See id. at 1594-96.

46.
See Ruth Marcus, Op-Ed., Citizens Ruling: An Intellectually Dishonest Power Grab, WAsiI.
PosT PoSTPARTISAN BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010, 2:17 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
postpartisan/2010/01/citizensiuling an-intellectua.html; see also Barnes, supra note 2
(discussing justices' views on elected judges); Stephanie Kirchgaessner, TSSupreme Court Lifts
Camnlaign Finance Linits, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://xww.ft.coim/cms/s/0/f17287a0-06aa1ldf-b426-00144feabdcO.htmlrnclick check=1 ("The long-awaited decision is expected to open
the floodgates on corporate money in elections, reversing restrictions that have been in place
since the 1940s that prohibited corporations from buying campaign ads from their own
treasuries."); Samuels, supra note 40 (criticizing the "aggressively wrong 5-to-4 Supreme Court
decision greatly escalating the power of corporate and union money in elections"); Richard L.
Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Suprene Court Kills Cammign inance Refinrn, SLATE, Jan. 21, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/id/2242209/
(discussing Citizens United and the "activist" court);
Totenberg, supra note 2 (discussing Justice O'Connor's criticism of state judicial elections).
47.
See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-state- union-address ("With all due deference to separation of powers, last
week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for
special interests-including foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our elections. I
don't think American elections should be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or
worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by the American people. And I'd urge
Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to correct some of these problems.").
48.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916-17 (2009).

49.

Id. at 964 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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corporations, fictional persons under the law, simply cannot be infringed.50
The implications of this holding are enormous.
Prior to Citizens United, corporate electioneering had to be done
through a PAC, which required corporations or individuals to make specific
contributions that were carefully tracked and registered with the Federal
Election Commission ("FEC").51 The purpose of a PAC was to allow any
corporation's "'stockholders and their families and its executive or
administrative personnel and their families' [to] pool their resources to
finance electioneering communications."52 Corporations and unions were
making extraordinary use of PACs prior to Citizens United, raising nearly one
billion dollars in the most recent election cycle.53 The "whole point of the
PAC mechanism" was to initiate a separate and distinct entity from the
corporation wherein corporate executives would be forbidden from
funneling general treasury funds into the PAC or from forcing shareholders
to support the PAC's explicit political purpose.54 The PAC allowed a
corporation to engage in electioneering without holding shareholder funds
hostage to the political whims or goals of corporate leadership. Congress
viewed this separation as a necessary protection of both the political process
and of the ability of shareholders to engage in politicking on their own
terms.5 5
Citizens United turns this seemingly sensible separation upon its head.
Today, corporations, through their human executives and boards of
directors, may now, in a mostly unfettered manner, engage in politicking
and electioneering with other people's money.56 Under the guise of free
speech, general treasury funds of any corporation may now be used to
campaign for or against candidates for the White House, the U.S. Senate,
the U.S. House of Representatives, state governors, state legislators, state
officers, and state judges.5 7 Prior to Citizens United, PACs could engage in the
same electioneering activity, but the critical difference now is that personal
and corporate contributions to a PAC, tracked and registered, are no longer
mandatory as a corporation can now spend its shareholders' value, from its
general treasury, in campaigning and electioneering.
To be sure, the prohibition against corporate-funded electioneering
prior to Citizens United was fairly narrow. The select stream of speech

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 956.
It. at 942-43.
Id. at 942 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (4) (A) (i) (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 942 n.30.
It. at 942-43, 945.
See infr Part V.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907-13.

PROCURING 'JUSTICE"?

99

regulated by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") as
"especially likely to corrupt the political process"58 was:
(1) broadcast, cable, or satellite communications; (2) capable of
reaching at least 50,000 persons in the relevant electorate; (3)
made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general federal
election; (4) by a labor union or a non-MCFL, nonmedia
corporation; (5) paid for with general treasury funds; and (6)
"susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 59
The Citizens United majority believed this prohibition so substantially
injurious to a corporation's right to free speech that it struck down that
portion of the BCRA as unconstitutional. Thus, the practical change in the
law is simply that corporations can now use funds from their general
treasuries to campaign through previously foreclosed media outlets,
extolling explicit preferences for candidates meant to reach 50,000 persons
close to an election.60 While PACs were able to engage in such campaigning
pre-Citizens United, corporations can now engage in the kind of
electioneering previously forbidden. This is a subtle change of massive
proportions. 6 ' Capertonfully displayed the potential mischief this subtle shift
created.
IV. CAPFRTON
Ironically, just months before handing down Citizens United, the
Supreme Court decided Caperton, a case where political campaign
contributions played a significant role in the election of a judge that would
later sit in judgment over the wealthy benefactor that provided the necessary
campaign contributions and PAC television advertising to see the preferred
candidate seated.6 2 In Caperton, Don Blankenship, president and Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") of A.T. Massey Coal, contributed more than $3
million to support the candidacy of Brent Benjamin for the West Virginia
Supreme Court in a partisan judicial election race. A majority of the $3
million contribution was to a PAC called "For the Sake of the Kids" which
aired anti-incumbent Warren McGraw commercials on a constant loop for
weeks prior to the supreme court election, asking citizens to reject "Radical"

58.

Id. at 945 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

59.

Id. at 944 (citations omitted).

60.
Id. at 907-13 (majority opinion). This practical change applies to unions as well,
though the impact will be significantly different. See supra note 7. An analysis of these
differences is beyond the scope of this Essay.
61.

See infrl Part V.

62.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2252 (2009).
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McGraw as a supreme court judge.63 Amazingly, during this harsh
electioneering activity, Massey Coal had been hit with a $50 million adverse
jury verdict for tortiously injuring the business of a competitor, an appeal
that was pending before the West Virginia Supreme Court. The judges
elected in the very cycle wherein Blankenship contributed the $3 million
toward electing Benjamin would determine the fate of the sizable verdict
against Massey, including whether the award would stand.6 4 One can
imagine a scenario where Blankenship weighed the costs and benefits of
supporting a corporate-friendly candidate for the state supreme court and
decided that $3 million was a wise investment if it could make a $50 million
verdict disappear.
The bitterly contested partisan election, complete with vicious attack
ads and charges of misrepresentation flying,65 resulted in the incumbent
McGraw's defeat and Benjamin's assumption of a seat on the West Virginia
Supreme Court. Predictably, when Caperton came before that state supreme
court months later, now-Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote that
reversed the jury verdict against Massey Coal and Blankenship, the company
and man that were primarily responsible for ushering Benjamin onto the
court. 66 Plaintiff Caperton moved before the appeal "to disqualify nowJustice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia Code
of Judicial Conduct, based on the conflict caused by Blankenship's
campaign involvement."6 7 Benjamin denied this motion. Throughout the
machinations of the appeal and subsequent rehearings, Caperton moved to
disqualify Benjamin three times as incapable of being fair and impartial;
Benjamin rejected each of those motions. Thereafter, on appeal and again
on rehearing, Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of Massey Coal and
reversed the $50 million jury verdict on disparate grounds, albeit
acknowledging that Massy had engaged in tortious business activity
68
deserving of sanction.
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Caperton, it waded into the
normally amorphous arena ofjudicial recusal and disqualification standards.

63.
For examples of the television advertising run against incumbent West Virginia
Supreme CourtJustice Warren McGraw by Don Blankenship and the PAC "For the Sake of the
Kids," see Too Radica, YTn uiil, http://www.youtube.com/watchv=A4Mzgl7zHIU (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010), And Io the Sake ( the Kids, YOUTU BE, http://www.youtube.coim/watch?v-qyb8xL
TJ6SM (last visited Oct. 19, 2010), and McGra Too Soft on Crime, YouTUtBE, http://wmy.
youtube.com/watchv=HpYVg56gic (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
64.

Capberon, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58.

65.
See William Kistner, fjstice Io Sale?, AMERICAN RADIOWORKS, http://americanradio
works.publicradio.org/features/judges/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010); supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
66.
See Caperion, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-59 (discussing the history between Justice Benjamin,
Massey Coal, and Blankenship).

67.

Id. at 2257.

68.

Id. at 2258.
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Long left to the discretion of a challenged judge, the Supreme Court
offered a new standard for those judges who owe their judicial post to
generous campaign contributors. In evaluating whether a probability of bias
exists to the extent that it violates a party's due process rights to a fair trial,
the Supreme Court held:
Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a
probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal, but this is an
exceptional case. We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual
bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions-when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the
election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the
outcome of the election. 69
In announcing this new standard, the Supreme Court extended its long held
due process recusal standard-that the due process clause requires a judge
to recuse herself when she "has 'a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest' in a case"-to include scenarios where significant campaign
contributions are bestowed upon a particular judge by interested parties
before the court. 70 The Court opined that "[t]his rule reflects the maxim
that '[n]o man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause; because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity."' 71 In analyzing the Caperton scenario against its new standard, the
Court had little trouble finding that Benjamin should have recused himself
72
and avoided the actual bias that informed his vote in the Massey appeal.
The Caperton Court found that Blankenship's contributions "had a
significant and disproportionate influence" in placing Benjamin on the case
73
that posed the conflict.
While the Supreme Court acted boldly in recognizing the influence of
campaign contributions on the ability of elected judges to act impartially
and free from bias or to refuse the "possible temptation ...

to .

.

. lead him

not to hold the balance nice, clear and true," 74 the Court was careful, almost
nanic, in limiting the reach of its holding to the "extreme," "rare," and

69.
70.

Id. at 2263-64 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2259 (quoting Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).

71.

Id. (quoting TE FtDRALIsT No. 10, at 59

2003)).
72.
73.
74.

It. at 2265.
Id. at 2264.
Id. at 2265 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"exceptional" facts of the Caperton case.75 As pointed out in the biting
dissent, the majority "over and over" limited its holding to the very
extraordinary circumstance where a campaign contributor donates
disproportionate and significant amounts of money to ajudicial candidate at
the same time that a case is or will be pending before the very court in which
the judge seeks election.76 Truly, this recusal guidance will likely have very
little impact because of its excruciatingly narrow holding.
In light of the Caperton holding, one might logically presume that the
majority author actually had a prescient sense that Citizens United was
forthcoming and that the floodgates of corporate campaign contributions
would soon be flung open.77 Little comfort can be taken from Caperton's
conclusions in connection with LeRoy's empirical evidence described above,
where partisan-elected judges are more likely to be biased against employees
and biased in favor of corporate interests, simply because mandating recusal
in scenarios of manipulating corporate contributions must be "extreme" and
significantly disproportionate. Corporate leaders, having clear guidance
from the case, will be much too savvy to get caught up in the Caperton net
when placing preferred judges on the nation's courts.
V. AN EMERGING CORPORATOCRACY
Caperton acknowledges the bias-inducing potential of massive campaign
contributions to elected judges who are duty bound to act without bias. Do
Partisan Elections of Judges Produce Unequal justice When Courts Review
Employment Arbitrations? provides emerging empirical evidence that judges
who are elected in partisan races, where campaign contributions are
significant, trend strongly toward favoring employers and corporate interests
while disfavoring employees. Citizens United strips back the protections
Congress provided the American election process from unfettered corporate
bankrolling and electioneering. This combination of events is potentially
toxic.
Simply stated, Caperton reveals a reality wherein targeted judicial
positions are nearly, if not fully, bought and paid for by powerful corporate
interests intent on influencing judicial outcome.78 Professor LeRoy's
empirical study infers that when corporate interests are successful in
positioning judges as pawns, their moves are predictably and strongly in
favor of those corporate interests that positioned them. 79 Finally, Citizens

75.

Id. at 2272.

76.

Id.

77. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the majority opinions of both Caperton and Citizens
United. The four liberal leaning judges on Caperton (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) and
the four conservative leaning judges on Citizens United (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito)
joined him.
78.

See supraPart IV.

79.

See supraPart II.
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United literally invites corporate interests inside the electioneering process
and enables corporations to seize an even more intimate position in U.S.
elections going forward.80 Some argue that this powerful new ability to
control elections moves our nation from a democracy toward an emerging
corporatocracy.81
While this potentially toxic prescription may sound intoxicating to
some, most likely those whose interests will be furthered in this new era of
corporate electioneering, others may simply agree with the Citizens United
majority in holding that American corporations should have their ability to
speak freely within the election context protected-what harm can be done?
Those favoring the Citizens United outcome suggest that U.S. citizens should
hear from all relevant voices, including corporations, and then freely choose
from amongst all competing messages which ring particularly true when
deciding upon whom to elect. In principle, this view is attractive and
convincing. However, several doctrines of corporate law and recent trends in
its practice should be examined before determining that corporations, and
their newly actuated election voices, should be considered harmless.
A.

OiHERPEOPLL"SMONLY

The most basic principle in corporate law is that corporations exist for
the sole purpose of maximizing profits for its shareholders.82 Limited
exceptions exist that allow corporations to make meaningful but reasonable
contributions to charitable organizations and public institutions for the
purpose of increasing goodwill and contributing to the communities in
which the corporations do business.83 A corporation is viewed as a fictional
person under the law and as such, has the right to sue and be sued and after
Citizens United, has the right to exercise its free speech at all times and in all
places, particularly during election cycles.84 Of course, as a fictional person,
the corporation cannot function without human management, so corporate
law provides a management mechanism of shareholder ownership of a
corporation with voting rights, an elected Board of Directors oversight
regime where shareholders elect board members, and day-to-day business
management by executives selected by the overseeing board. The CEO is the
primary leader of the corporation and is tasked with managing the daily
operations and also typically sits on the Board of Directors.

80.

See supra Part III.

81.
82.
83.
84.

See supra note 13.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919).
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907-13 (2010).
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Corporate law has evolved to the point where the CEO has become an
almost invincible corporate character.8 5 The model of shareholder
democracy has been ameliorated to the point that the CEO and his pursuit
of personal fortune is the primary driver behind most corporate
positioning.8 6 The CEO dominates American corporations to the extent that
he is held to very few standards of responsibility and is able to stave off all
shareholder dissent through careful calculation.8 7 According to Professor
Steven Ramirez, "CEOs of public companies have the unique privilege of
8
picking their own nominal supervisors-the board of directors."8
Today, the CEO in the United States has the power to appoint the
board of directors that "oversees" his performance,8 9 to maneuver board
members off of the board if they challenge his decisions, 90 to establish his
compensation through the board committee that he appoints,9 ' to make
reckless decisions that are primarily protected by the business judgment
rule,92 to exercise nearly unfettered power as the fiduciary duties of care and

85.
See Steven A. Ramirez, Ihe Special In/test Race to (U Primacy and the End o/ Coporate
Governance Law, 32 Dii .J. CORP. L. 345, 345 (2007) ("Corporate governance law in the United
States is deeply flawed.").
86.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The yth IIo/ tei Sharehold(er rIanchie, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
679-81 (2007) (examining the importance of corporate elections and having directors who are
accountable to shareholders); see also Ramirez, supra note 85, at 353 (portraying the American
public corporation as a "'dictatorship' of the CEO").
87.
Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Couporate Democrac ": Shareholder Voice and
lanagement Compensation, 77 SI.JOIIN's L. Riv. 735, 758-60 (2003).
88.
Steven A. Ramirez, Ameian Corpoate Govertnance and Globalization, 18 BERKLEY LA
RAZA L.J. 47, 55 (2007) [hereinafter Ramirez, Ameican(omporale
Gow nance] (describing the
proxy rules that essentially allow the CEO and management to determine who leads a
corporation and established significant obstacles for shareholders who wish to nominate
persons for the board of directors); see Steven A. Ramirez, The End ( Copoirate Governance Law:
)ptimizing Regulatory Structues for a Race to the Top, 24 YAE J. ON RiEG. 313 (2007) [hereinafter
Ramirez, TheEnd (f Copora Gjove;rnanceLaw].
89.
Ramirez, American Coporate Governance, supra note 88, at 56 ("This means that the CEO
may stack the board with cultural and social clones in order to maximize compensation.
Shareholder democracy is a myth in the U.S., and management interests have worked to keep it
a myth." (footnote omitted)).
90.
See CNBC on Assignmeal: Re/blion in the Magic Kingdom (CNBC television broadcast Jan.
24, 2005) (Maria Bartaromo reports on the famed Disney shareholder lawsuit in the Michael
Ovitz executive compensation case where CEO Michael Eisner deftly maneuvered Roy Disney
off of The Walt Disney Company's board of directors when Disney began challenging Eisner's
authority).
91.
See Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law, supra note 88, at 333 ("[T] he CEO
may stack the board with cultural and social clones in order to maximize compensation.").
92.
See Marc I. Steinberg, Commentary, The Evisceration ( the Duy o/ Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919
(1988) (examining director-protection statutes); see also Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith,
45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 344 (2006) ("The paradox of Smih is that, while it was perceived to
heighten the duty of care applicable to directors of corporations, it in fact operated to dilute
the obligations of the directors.").
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loyalty have been judicially emasculated to the point of near nonexistence,9 3
and to escape private shareholder lawsuits as class action securities fraud
actions have been congressionally neutered to a near terminal state. 94 U.S.
corporate law has empowered CEOs and corporate management to generate
personal short-term profit and gain at the expense of long-term vitality and
shareholder profit maximization in astounding ways.0 5
At base, CEOs and corporate boards are charged with overseeing the
value of corporate wealth that belongs primarily to shareholders and only
nominally to them as corporate leaders. Corporate executives and board
members stand in a fiduciary relation to shareholders and are trusted to
make sound decisions on behalf of the shareholders who have entrusted
them with their wealth. Unfortunately, corporations, or more accurately, the
human beings that actuate and lead a corporation, have proven repeatedly
and consistently over the past several decades that they will act recklessly
when spending other people's money. The financial market crisis of 2008
provides ample evidence that reckless pursuit of profit often prevails when
executive leadership is taking risks with other people's money.96 Further,
corporate executives are often careless when deciding upon what charitable
contributions to make, again, when deciding how to spend the shareholders'
money. Perhaps the most egregious example of irresponsible corporate
caretaking occurred in the wake of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP") bailout where funds were dispersed to major corporations to save
the economy from collapse. Corporate leaders' determination of how to
spend and shepherd taxpayer funds provided through the largess of the U.S.
government, particularly in light of the irresponsible decision making that
necessitated the TARP disbursements, highlights the recklessness and harm

93.
See Bebchuk, supa note 86, at 679-82 (examining the importance of corporate
elections and having directors who are accountable to shareholders); see also Ramirez, The End
of Cmporate Governan Law, suira note 88, at 317 (advocating the displacement of courts, state
legislatures, and other politicized regulatory agencies in favor of "an expert administrative
agency subject to market tests and resistant to special interest influence").
94.
See andre douglas pond cummings, 'Ain'/ No Glory in Pain": How the 1994 Republican
Revolution and the PrivateSecurities Litigation Refmni Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States
CapitalMankets, 83 Nii. L. Riv. 979, 1004-33 (2005) (describing the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act and the myriad ways that it strips shareholders of the ability to hold corporate
executives accountable for fraud); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Refrm in Private
SecuritiesLiligalion: Dealing with the Merilorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 Wm. & MARY L. Riv. 1055
(1999) (examining the recent congressional preemption of state-law class-action suits against
publicly held companies).
95.
See supra notes 85-94; see also Ramirez, The End of Coiporate Governane Law, supa note
88, at 334 (describing how lax corporate laws allowed one company to "backdate[] options
grants to enrich a dead executive").
96.
See andie douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market Crisis 962 (May 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1609816 (describing the failures in corporate governance and by executive
leadership that precipitated the financial market crisis of 2008).
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that corporate decision makers can cause when dealing with other people's
money.9 7
First, in connection with the financial market crisis of 2008, recent
reports, newspaper accounts, and congressional testimony reveal that from
the very top of Wall Street corporate leadership all the way down to the
trenches of unregulated mortgage brokering, corporations, through their
human leaders, acted with reckless disregard for the value of shareholders,
the life savings of employees and investors, and the mortgage burdens of
clients and average citizen homeowners.9 8 Insatiable greed across the board
caused the subprime market crisis, but the driving force behind the greed
was Wall Street's ravenous appetite for subprime mortgages that could be
bound into asset-backed securities, sold into collateralized debt obligations,
hedged by credit default swaps, and then sold in tranches to global investors
at mind bending profits. 99 This market was based primarily on a housing
bubble that collapsed causing nearly every important U.S. investment bank
and commercial bank to face certain collapse if not for the taxpayer bailout.
The wild risk-taking adopted by nearly every corporate executive prior to the
market collapse was breathtaking. Despite warning signs, signals, and
contrary risk modeling, corporate executives intentionally ignored these
100
signs and gambled with and lost billions of dollars of shareholder value.
Second, famed investor Warren Buffet, in recognizing the incredible
phenomenon of corporate executives spending other people's money,
originated a term he called "elephant bumping." Corporate law, while
holding sacrosanct its primary principle of "maximizing shareholder
profits," carves out an exception allowing modest charitable contributions
from corporate coffers.' 0 ' Buffet describes the process of elephant bumping
as one where a primary fundraiser who is seeking a generous charitable
contribution from a targeted corporate executive will invite a very important
celebrity or superstar executive to accompany the fundraiser to the pitch
meeting. Once the fundraiser is sitting in the office of the targeted
corporate executive with an elephant (very important executive or celebrity)
beside him, nodding approvingly whenever the fundraiser asks for the large
corporate contribution, Buffet reports that the fundraiser is successful 100%

97.

See id. at 15-18.

98.

See id. at 29-60.

99.

See id. at 44-60.

100.
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See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582 (N.J. 1953) (holding that
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express statutory provisions").
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of the time in receiving the large contribution the fundraiser seeks. 02 Thus,
elephant bumping occurs by stroking the ego of a sitting executive by
bringing an elephant into the meeting causing the targeted corporate
executive, careless and self-important, to view himself as important enough
to host elephants and thus capable of pledging shareholder value as a
contribution that affirms his importance. 103 Buffet muses that never has the
fundraiser seen a corporate executive take out his own personal checkbook
and contribute to the charity personally; rather, each and every targeted
executive, feeling his own importance, commits shareholder value to the
particular charity of interest. 104
Finally, in considering how corporate executives spend other people's
money, the TARP bailout funds were used primarily to prop up Wall Street
titans at a cost to U.S. taxpayers of more than $3 trillion dollars. 05 Rather
than liberating (or freeing up) lending, which was a portion of the stated
purpose of the infusion of TARP funds, the corporate executives hoarded
the taxpayer gifted capital to improve their balance sheet perfornance.106
With massive infusion of taxpayer capital and huge loans made available to
Wall Street firms from the Federal Reserve Bank, Wall Street responded
almost immediately by paying near record executive compensation bonuses
for 2009 "performance." Additionally, Wall Street leadership chose to use
millions of dollars of TARP funds, provided by U.S. taxpayers, to pay
lobbyists to fiercely lobby against new financial services regulations Congress
was considering in light of the reckless behavior of those same executives.107
Commercial and investment banks used the taxpayer bailout funds
provided by the U.S. government to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in
executive compensation. Wall Street firms used taxpayer bailout funds
derived from government corporate welfare to pay hundreds of millions of
dollars to lobbying firms employed to aggressively fight new financial sector

102.
Warren E. Buffet et al., Jlastile Takeovers andjunk Bond Financing:A Panel Discussion, in
KNIGHTS, RUDERS, AND TIRGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 10, 14 (John C.
Coffee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
103.
See id. (explaining that "when they look around the room and they see all these other
elephants [they assume] that they must be an elephant too, or why would they be there?").
104.
See id. ("[N]ot one CEO has reached in his pocket and pulled out 10 bucks of his
own . . . .").
105.
See Steven A. Ramirez, Subprine Bailouts and the Predalor S/ate, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81,
91, 100 (2009).
106.
See id. (describing the hoarding of capital by Wall Street firms using taxpayer bailout
funds to improve balance sheets and record record profits rather than lending to a cash
strapped citizenry).
107.
Se Aaron Luchetti & Stephen Grocer, Wall iSeet on Track Io Awaid Recoid Pay, WAil ST.
J., Oct. 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125547830510183749.html; see also Elizabeth
Williamson & Brody Mullins, Firmns Keep Lobbying as They Get TARP Cash, WAlIt SI.'J., Jan. 23,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123267702062508887.html; Tim Canova, Symposium
Presentation at Equality and Justice in the Obama Era, Southeast/Southwest People of Color
Conference: Economic Justice (Mar. 26, 2010).
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regulation. The Fed has spent more than $3 trillion to prop up a system that
has failed taxpayers without any interrogation of the system that enabled the
meltdown and without any functional oversight or forced responsibility onto
Wall Street elites. 0 8
When charged with caretaking either shareholder wealth or taxpayer
funds, corporate executives historically make very bizarre decisions. Whether
elephant bumping is motivating corporate donations or executives are
leading their companies to near bankruptcy (requiring taxpayer bailout), it
is to this group of leaders, with proven reckless and negligent leadership
records, that the Supreme Court through Citizens United confers unfettered
ability to spend shareholder funds in campaigning for preferred politicians
and judges. To those that tend to view this new power as harmless, a
potential result of Citizens United is that corporations are now positioned to
exercise the same irresponsible disdain for fundamental principles of risk
assessment, fairness, equity, and duty in the election process that was
exercised in the run-up to the global financial crisis. How this newly
unfettered voice is used, and in what kind of attack ads and candidate
hijacking results, 109 remains to be seen.
B.

WHOLLADS?

Who is leading America's corporations? If Citizens United stands to
transform American politicking and elections as we know them, it seems
prudent to examine who leads the American corporations today that have
gained this additional power. Of all Fortune 100 board of director seats,
83% are held by men, primarily white nen." 0 Amongst the Fortune 500,
only five CEOs are African-American, and only one of those is an AfricanAmerican woman. Only four Latinos are CEOs of Fortune 500 companies.
Just fourteen women currently lead a Fortune 500 company.111 The most
dominant corporate positions in the world, CEOs of Fortune 500
corporations, are overwhelmingly white male.
Of the Fortune 500 board of director seats, women hold only 15% of
those seats, Latinos hold only 3% of directorships, whereas there are fewer
African American directors, and the number is declining." 2 It is fair to say

108.
See andre douglas pond cummings, Symposium Presentation at Equality and Justice in
the Obama Era, Southeast/Soutlnvest People of Color Conference: Economic Justice (Mar. 26,
2010).
109.

See supra note 63.

110.
See Press Release, Catalyst, New Alliance for Board Diversity Report Finds Little
Change in Diversity on Corporate Boards (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.catalyst.org/pressrelease /55 /new-alliance-for-board-diversity-report-finds-little-change-in-diversity-on-corporateboards.
111.
See NANCY M. CART ER, JAN COMBOPIANO & RACI wiL SOAREs 2009 CATALYST CiNSU4S:
FORTU NE 500 WOMEN BoAR) DIRECTORS (2009), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/320/
2009 fortune 500 census wormen board directors.pdf.
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that white men continue to dominate leadership in America's corporations
despite the increasing voting power and representation of minorities and
women in the workplace and the nation generally. "To the extent that
Citizens United shifts political power to corporations, fundamentally, it shifts
power away from communities of color (and women) notwithstanding their
increased voting power."1 13
Nearly every corporate leader that drove the global economy to the
point of collapse, those men that led Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns,
Citigroup,
Goldman
Sachs, Merrill
Lynch,
Washington
Mutual,
Countrywide, and Bank of America, were a "precise" kind of corporate
leader, specifically male, white, wealthy, privileged, disconnected, and
possessing a voracious appetite for risky profiteering.11 4 Despite repeated
calls for Wall Street to diversify and for corporate America to adopt a
leadership paradigm that embraces a different kind of worldview
perspective, these calls have gone largely unheeded.
In the pre-Citizens United election scheme, PACs were the primary
electioneering arm of a corporation. Crucially, PACs could only accept
individual contributions and corporations were unable to fund PAC activity
out of their general treasuries. Corporate executives were forced to bring
out their own checkbooks and spend their own money, reducing their own
personal wealth, when electioneering and campaigning. Citizens United
radically changes this conceptualization. Now, corporate executives, who
have proven reckless and negligent repeatedly, are now able to freely assign
corporate funds and shareholder value to campaigning and electioneering.
There is little evidence to suggest that these executives will be careful,
thoughtful, or responsible with the new ability to spend shareholder funds at
their disposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
A five-member activist Supreme Court has delivered the future of
American elections into the hands of America's corporate leadership,
described above as reckless and myopic. 115 U.S. corporate leadership in 2010
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is simply a band of profit-driven, often careless, narrow, non-diverse group of
leaders that seemingly holds a particular laissez faire nindset that represents
only a miniscule percentage of U.S. citizens and interests. In light of this
deliverance, a follow-up empirical study five or ten years from now to update
campaign contribution impact on partisan-elected judges may very well find
even more dismal results than what has been uncovered in 2010. Any inquiry
into how electioneering funds will be spent has been signaled already
through an examination of how TARP funds were exhausted. Following a
highly politicized and controversial bailout, Wall Street banks and firms used
the taxpayer bailout funds to shore up their balance sheets (rather than
lending the funds to consumers), pay enormous 2009 bonuses claiming
record profitability (rather than acknowledging the profits being gleaned on
the back of Federal Reserve Bank loans and taxpayers bailout funds), and
lobby intensely against new financial sector reform that would regulate away
the ability of corporate executives to recklessly trade in or gamble their
corporate funds to the point of bankruptcy (rather than humbly assisting
the Government in conceptualizing moderate, common sense regulation
that would prohibit too big to fail institutions). 116 Little question remains,
post-Caperton and Do PartisanElections ofJudges Produce UnequalJustice Wien
Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?, as to where or how corporations will
spend their new Citizens United allowance.
Seating judges that are hostile to workers and cozy to corporate
interests will surely be a byproduct of Citizens United. Electing legislators that
are passionate laissez faire capitalists and antagonistic toward common sense
corporate regulation will surely be a byproduct of Citizens United, despite a
clear failure of capitalism in the recent financial market crisis. 117 To reverse
the trend toward an emerging corporatocracy, radical corporate law reform
is necessary. The first step is embracing a completely different corporate
leadership paradigm. Is America ready to strip the CEO of his preeminence?
Will Congress and the courts be willing to return power to the true
corporation owners, the shareholders? Might Congress be willing to return
private lawsuit power to shareholders that have been methodically stripped
over the past two decades? Whether Wall Street and corporate America are
willing to embrace diverse leadership and a genuine change in corporate
culture is a question to which Citizens United will require an answer.
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